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1. Introduction 
Various biological agents such as bacteria, parasites, viruses and toxins may be deliberately 
released and spread through feed, food, water and air to cause harm and panic (Rotz et al., 
2004). These biological agents can infect humans and animals but also crops (Gullino, 2008). 
Bioterrorism is probably the most inter-sectoral and international challenges among 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. To improve the interactions 
between these sectors there are some key issues involving R&D, training, event exercises, 
early warning and effective communication strategies that need to be addressed to rapidly 
share event information related to detection and identification. In this perspective, 
diagnostic capabilities are critical components to enhance the preparedness against 
bioterrorism (Morse, 2004). Covert and overt incidents will lead to various alarm chains. In a 
covert incident, which is characterized by an unannounced release, the early response and 
detection will be driven by public health organizations. However, an overt incident is 
characterized by the fact that the perpetrator announces responsibility and the response will 
therefore be driven by law enforcement. A diagnostic response strategy must be able to 
address both types of incidents. This requires a multidisciplinary network composed of 
diagnostic capabilities both in law enforcement agencies and public health organizations 
such as environmental, agricultural, veterinary, and food. As a result, laboratory response 
networks have been developed in different countries. The US Laboratory Response Network 
(LRN) was established in 1999. Its formation was based on a presidential order (Decision 
Directive 39) in which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Association of 
Public Health Laboratories (APHL), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and United States 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was involved (Morse, 
2003). The objective of the US LRN is to ensure an effective laboratory response to 
bioterrorism by improving the law enforcement and public health laboratory infrastructure. 
The US LRN links local, state and national public health laboratories, as well as agriculture, 
veterinary, military, water- and food testing laboratories. In addition, the LRN links also to 
international laboratories in Canada, Australia, Japan, United Kingdom and Germany. 
Several other countries have developed similar laboratory networks such as Canada (CRTI, 
2007), Australia (Editorial, 2004) and South Korea (Hwang, 2008). A Swedish LRN was 
established in 2009 with the aim of facilitating collaboration between law enforcement, first 
responders and public health agencies. The Swedish Forum for Biopreparedness Diagnostics 
(FBD) was established in 2007. FBD is a national laboratory multiagency cooperation, 
consisting of partners from the National Food Administration (SLV), the Swedish Defense 
Research Agency (FOI), the National Veterinary Institute (SVA) and the Swedish Institute 
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for Communicable Disease Control (SMI). The aim of FBD is to strengthen the diagnostic 
capacity in Sweden regarding dangerous pathogens. The various laboratory networks that 
have been established in different countries have more or less the same objectives: rapid 
detection, identification and characterization of pathogens, targeted surveillance programs, 
strengthen laboratory response capacities and capabilities, and recovery. This includes; 
harmonization of diagnostic methods, increasing diagnostic capacity, training and exercises, 
interactions with other networks, and coordination of diagnostic emergency response. For 
these reasons, a broad diagnostic portfolio is needed in order to respond to covert and overt 
bioterrorism incidents. Diagnostic collaboration and networks are essential for an efficient 
response to a bioterrorism attack. Diagnostic response strategies must consider the abilities 
of the network in handling of the following: laboratories expertise, index case, decision 
making, tracing and tracking, and crime scene investigations.  
2. Strategic planning 
To obtain international multisectoral cooperation, in terms of bioterrorism prevention, 
policy makers have an important function. Policy makers at the local, regional, national and 
international levels must work in the same direction. However, this is not always realistic 
and as a result strategic planning is crucial, and the use of planning scenarios (DHS, 2005) 
can enhance strategic planning (Davis et al., 2007). Interagency collaborative efforts are one 
of the most critical factors to ensure an efficient bioterrorism preparedness and response 
plan. Several intergovernmental organizations such as INTERPOL (INTERPOL, 2010), 
World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) have ongoing programs and activities to counter the 
threat of attacks on humans, animals and plants (Pearson, 2006). The Biological and Toxin 
Weapon Convention (BTWC) prohibits the deliberate release of agents to attack plants, 
animals and humans (UN, 1972). However, effective prevention and countermeasures for 
deliberate attacks need to be developed in harmony with measures to control either natural 
or accidental outbreaks of disease. 
A lot of strategic planning is taking place at the national level. For example, reports by the 
US Congressional Research Service identifies strategic planning as one of four critical areas 
of bioterrorism preparedness and that agency implementation will be a key component to 
translate strategic goals into effective programs and polices (Gottron, 2011). The European 
Union has also developed strategic plans on how to counter bioterrorism and CBRN attacks 
that are outlined in the EU CBRN Action Plan (EC, 2009). The Action Plan will be 
implemented in the period 2010 to 2014. Some examples of other countries focusing on 
strategic planning for bioterrorism are Canada (CRTI, 2007), South Korea (Hwang, 2008). A 
lot of progress has been made in strengthening local, regional/state, national and 
international capacities to detect and respond to bioterrorism since letters containing spores 
of Bacillus anthracis were sent via the US mail in 2001 (Rotz et al., 2004) (Smith, 2004). The 
anthrax letters caused the CDC to revise its strategic plan for bioterrorism preparedness and 
response (Koplan, 2001), which is focused on the following six focus areas:  
1. Preparedness planning and readiness assessment (including the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile);  
2. Detection, surveillance and epidemiology capacity;  
3. Laboratory capacity including diagnosis and characterization of biological agents;  
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4. Response and health alert network/communications and information technology;  
5. Communicating Health Risks and Health Information Dissemination; and  
6. Education and training (Kun et al., 2002).  
The European political leadership has made efforts to improve a coordinated EU response to 
the bioterrorism incidents. (Sundelius et al., 2004) (Tegnell et al., 2003). The efforts have 
improved strategic, tactical, and operational aspects of preparedness planning and response 
(Brandeau et al., 2009). The strategic planning efforts have formed the basis for multisectoral 
R&D activities within the field of bioterrorism diagnostics and have improved the 
laboratory response networks and interagency cooperation. 
3. Laboratory infrastructure and communication 
Interagency and multi-sectoral laboratory cooperation requires a well developed 
infrastructure in terms of (i) communication and IT-systems, (ii) facilities, (iii) 
instruments/equipments and (iv) staff. A solid interagency cooperation of the public health 
laboratories, veterinary, agriculture, military, and water- and food-testing laboratories 
infrastructure must be based on strategic plans. These plans must facilitate building 
integrated response architectures and the promotion of coordination. Various tools, such as 
discrete event simulation modeling (Hupert et al., 2002) and information infrastructure tools 
(Kun et al., 2002) are useful in developing the interagency cooperation for laboratory 
bioterrorism preparedness. 
Communication and IT-systems. The laboratory infrastructure must include services to 
inform and communicate accurate diagnostic data at different levels (Zarcone et al., 2010). A 
key element for bioterrorism preparedness is information exchange and diseases outbreaks 
reporting (Horton et al., 2002). Surveillance systems are crucial for early warning of 
biothreat agents and a coordinated information infrastructure between surveillance and 
laboratory activities is needed. It has been found that there is a need for coordination 
between syndromic and laboratory based surveillance (Sintchenko et al., 2009). The 
diagnostic response strategies must simultaneously fit both the epidemiological and 
criminal investigations and ongoing activities to improve capabilities to share electronic 
laboratory diagnostic data (Zarcone et al., 2010). Rational communication procedures are a 
key mechanism to effective bioterrorism preparedness (Pien et al., 2006). Appropriate and 
secure communication tools are especially important in the alarm chain allowing police and 
first responders to contact public and animal health official in terms of covert and overt 
bioterrorism incident (Holmdahl et al,. 2011). In addition, it is important to facilitate 
communication between clinicians, sentinel laboratories and US LRN reference laboratories. 
A failure to communicate information may lead to delayed detection and a greater pressure 
to handle the incident (Pien et al., 2006). An important infrastructure feature is data 
handling and electronic information sharing. The US LRN includes approximately 1200 
users which require a central point of contact (Morse, 2003). To securely share standard 
laboratory results between laboratories, LRN Results Messenger (LRN RM) has been 
established (CDC, 2007). The need for sharing data was clearly identified during the anthrax 
letter incident in 2001. Approximately 125,000 samples and more than 1 million tests were 
reported during the event (CDC, 2007). The lack of efficient data sharing tools made it 
difficult for the laboratories to share data. Laboratory results are critical during an outbreak 
and they facilitate the decision making. Therefore, to support early detection and response 
the laboratory should share data (CDC, 2007). The LRN RM has been installed in more than 
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150 LRN laboratories including public health, military, federal, food, veterinary and 
international labs (CDC, 2007). It allows storage and sharing of tests results for biological 
LRN assays. In addition, the data management supports electronic reporting of proficiency 
testing results and the ability of laboratories to review their test results and their 
performance. 
Facilities and laboratories. To respond to human, animal and plant biothreat agents a 
number of laboratory facilities are needed; e.g. clinical laboratories, animal laboratories, 
plant laboratories, environmental laboratories, military laboratories and forensic 
laboratories. Most biothreat agents, which are also select agents (CDC) (APHIS), require 
various biosafety levels due to their pathogenic characteristics. According to work biosafety 
regulations agents such as Variola major (smallpox) and viral hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, 
Marburg, etc) requires work at Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4). Other agents such as Bacillus 
anthracis, Fransicella tularensis, and Yersinia pestis require BSL-3 laboratories. Foot and Mouth 
Disease virus (FMD), which is an animal pathogen, also requires a BSL-3 laboratory. In total, 
there are various laboratory levels such as BSL-2, BSL-3, BSL-4 and BSL-2 and BSL-3 animal 
facilities. All of these facilities have various design features and each facility has to fulfill 
different functional and operational goals. 
 
Fig. 1. The US Laboratory Response Networks in terms of operational components; National 
laboratories to perform definitive characterization, Reference laboratories to perform 
confirmatory testing and Sentinel labs to recognize and rule-out (Nauschuetz, 2005). 
Instruments/equipments. The laboratories must be equipped with appropriate and 
evaluated instruments that also are operational in a BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratory. The interior 
of these labs must also be designed for different chemical and gas decontamination 
methods. Many BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories are composed of stainless steel to allow 
decontamination work of highly pathogenic microorganisms, which require the highest 
level of cleanliness and durability. Proper biosafety cabinets, autoclaves, glove boxes and 
ventilation systems must continuously be monitored and tested. A lot of work in these 
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laboratories is based on traditional methods such as labor intensive cultivation, autopsy and 
necropsy. However, there is a need to have alternative methods for complementary tests 
such as molecular based instruments in a BSL-3 level or BSL-4 environment. It is therefore 
important to evaluate computers, DNA extraction robots and PCR equipment from an 
operational point of view for these laboratories. 
 
Fig. 2. The unique potassium iodide KI-discus-test, to validate a class II safety cabinet with a 
DNA isolation robot in a BSL-3 laboratory. The KI discus test is defined in the European 
Standard for microbiological safety cabinets, EN12469:2000 as a test method for validating 
the operator protection capabilities of the cabinet (Photo: SVA). 
Staff. Having trained personnel is critical for the overall bioterrorism preparedness effort 
(Barden, 2002) and leadership (Marshall et al., 2010). Additional training and education is 
necessary to work in BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs. Minimum requirements in terms of general 
biosafety training include definitions of biological and bio-hazardous materials, risk 
groups, biosafety containment levels, controls and protective clothing including staff at 
sentinel laboratories (Wagar et al., 2010). Various training courses are available and one 
example is a Bioterrorism Preparedness Training for LRN Sentinel Laboratories offered by 
the National Laboratory Training Network (NLTN, 2011). It is important to have training 
on various diagnostic methods as well as training related to biosafety and biosecurity 
(Kalish et al., 2009). Joint laboratory exercises are used to evaluate the laboratory 
organization. Education is also crucial in the other sectors such as veterinary laboratories 
(Lowenstine et al., 2006). 
4. Laboratory standards, certification and methods 
Many regulations, practices, programs and inspections have to be met and/or fulfilled to 
be allowed to work on biothreat agents. This requires inspections at organizational-, 
facility- and personnel level. The regulations and inspections differ from country to 
country and from sector to sector. The US Select Agents Program clearly regulates the use 
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and transfer of specific biological agents and the program promotes laboratory safety and 
security (CDC, 2010). Other countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, 
Japan, Australia and Canada also have programs for governing facilities and personnel 
working on biothreat agents (NCBI, 2009). The Biological Weapon Convention (BTWC) 
(UN, 1972) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR1540, 2004) states that each 
nation should take action to implement national measures to avoid misuse of biological 
agents. However, other groups also exist. One example is the Australian Group, which is 
an informal forum of countries which seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the 
development of biological weapons (AG, 2010). These various programs and conventions 
to avoid misuse of biological agents shall be considered for laboratories working on 
biothreat agents. 
Laboratory standards. In 2004 the World Health Organization (WHO) published the latest 
edition of their biosafety manual (WHO, 2004). After publication of this manual, WHO 
continued to work and in 2006 they published the Biorisk Management: Laboratory Biosecurity 
Guidance (WHO, 2006). This guide integrates biosafety and biosecurity. The European 
Committee for Standardization/Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN) has continued to 
work on the WHO Biorisk management standard, and in 2008 CEN published Laboratory 
Biorisk Management Standard CWA 15793:2008 (CEN, 2008). The biorisk management 
standard provides guidance to an organization to identify, monitor and control laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity in order to ensure that organizations are well prepared to respond 
if biological agents are released or go missing. 
Laboratory certification. For laboratories working on biothreat, BSL-3 and BSL-4 agents, it is 
important to have a certified laboratory to confirm that the organization and facility is 
working with the highest and most appropriate standards. For this reason the organization 
must operate within international guidelines and national regulations. Facilities working on 
biothreat agents require laboratory or personnel certification (Gottron, 2011). The laboratory 
certification process of BSL3- and BSL-4 laboratories involves compliance with a number of 
criteria in terms of bisafety and biosecurity. For instance, it includes a systematic review of 
safety processes within the laboratory such as personal protective equipment, building and 
system integrity and standard operating procedures (SOPs). It also includes administrative 
documentation and record retention systems. Therefore, to respond to a bioterrorism 
incident a laboratory certification process will form the basis for a well prepared and 
appropriate laboratory capability.  
Laboratory methods and harmonized protocols. Harmonized methods and protocols are 
extremely important for multisectoral cooperation (Hodges et al., 2010). This means that 
standard protocols and reagents must be used to confirm tests. These activities can differ 
from country to country. To allow development of standardized and validated methods for 
detection and identification of biothreat agents, proficiency testing and ring trials by 
sending samples to different laboratories are required. For this reason a Critical Reagents 
Program (CRP) has been established in the US. The CRP collection includes inactivated 
antigens of select agent, genomic materials from biothreat agents and monoclonal and 
polyclonal antibodies of biothreat agents (CRP, 2011). This is a key component of laboratory 
preparedness as shortages of critical reagents will significantly influence the response 
testing (APHL, 2006). Based on validated reagents new methods can be developed, 
evaluated and tested (Donoso Mantke et al., 2005). The LRN laboratories use standardized 
protocols and reagents to detect and identify biothreat agents. The standardized protocols 
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are developed in such a manner that they contain information for chain-of-custody 
requirements.  
5. Development of diagnostic response strategies 
Law enforcement and public health must plan together to develop diagnostic response 
strategies for overt and covert bioterrorism incidents. This involves joint efforts to: (i) 
follow-up on lessons learned from previous incidents; (ii) scenario planning, training and 
exercises; (iii) R&D activities; and (iv) validate and implement methods in response plans. 
Methods for detection and identification of microorganisms and toxins forms the basis 
(Skinner et al., 2009) (Musshoff et al., 2009). 
Lessons learned from bioterrorism incidents and biocrimes. Several bioterrorism incidents 
and biocrimes have taken place, which have provided important lessons learned. For 
example, some more well known cases includes a salmonellosis outbreak in Oregon, a 
shigellosis outbreak in Dallas, the anthrax attacks of 2001 (amerithrax) and the the Aum 
Shinrikyo’s attempt to develop biological weapons. The first case, the source of the 1984 
 
Attackers Motive Year and 
location 
Agent Distribution 
and 
transmission 
mode 
Reference 
Rajneeshee 
cult 
Religious motive to 
gain political 
control by 
influencing an 
election by making 
voters ill. 
1984, The 
Dalles, 
Oregon, USA 
Salmonella 
typhimurium 
ATCC 14028
Sallad 
bars/restaurants 
(blue cheese 
dressing, potato 
salad, lettuce) 
(Torok et 
al., 1997)  
Aum 
Shinrikyo 
An apocalyptic cult 
with a motive to 
trigger a world war
1993, Tokyo, 
Japan 
Bacillus 
anthracis 
Aerozolization 
of a liquid 
suspension of B. 
anthracis 
(Keim et 
al., 2001; 
Takahashi 
et al., 
2004) 
(Olson, 
1999) 
Lone wolf A laboratory 
employee invited 
other laboratory 
workers to eat 
pastries in the 
coffee room 
1996, at a 
clinical 
laboratory in 
Dallas, Texas, 
USA 
Shigella 
dysenteriae 
Type 2 
 Contamination 
of doughnuts 
and muffins 
(Kolavic 
et al., 
1997) 
Lone wolf Increase the 
importance of his 
research  
2001, USA 
(“Amerithrax”)
Bacillus 
anthracis 
Letters with 
powder 
(FBI, 
2006) 
(Butler et 
al., 2002) 
Table 1. Overview of some bioterrorism incidents/biocrimes (Dembek, 2007). 
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salmonellosis outbreak in The Dalles, Oregon, was puzzling beacuse the epidemiological 
investigation revealed multiple items of food were involved instead of a single suspect item 
(Table 1). In total, 751 salmonellosis cases were identified and 45 persons were hospitalized. 
This was a deliberate outbreak perpetrated by members of the Rajneeshee cult. The cult 
legally obtained Salmonella Typhimurium ATCC 14028 and spread cultures of this organism 
on salad bars in area restaurants. The cause of the outbreak was found to be due to 
intentional contamination in October 1985, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
investigated the cult (McDade et al., 1998). The FBI together with an Oregon public health 
laboratory official found an open vial of the strain in their laboratory more than a year after 
the outbreak took place. The culture of Salmonella Typhimurium ATCC 14028 found at the 
Rajneeshees farm was identical and indistinguishable from the outbreak strain that was 
isolated from clinical specimens and food items. The retrospective epidemiology was 
consistent and the deliberate contamination of the salad bars was confirmed (Torok et al., 
1997). The case demonstrated the need for having joint cooperation between law 
enforcement and public health investigations. In addition, the case showed that many 
different food items and matrices may be responsible for a deliberate foodborne outbreak 
challenging the diagnostic capabilities. Various sample preparations methods for the 
different food items and food matrices will be needed. 
In 1993 the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult released aerosolized spores of B. anthracis on two 
occasions. The first event took place in June when the cult sprayed B. anthracis from the roof 
of a building in downtown Tokyo. A month later the cult sprayed B. anthracis from a moving 
truck onto and around the Imperial Place and the Japan’s parliament building in Tokyo 
(Dembek, 2007). However, none of the attacks led to any anthrax cases. In 2001, samples 
collected from the exterior of the exposed buildings in Tokyo were analyzed and it was 
found that the B. anthracis isolates were similar to the Sterne 34F2 strain, which is the strain 
used in animal vaccines for anthrax and is regarded as nonpathogenic for 
immunocompetent individuals. The release of this strain had little possibility of causing 
harm or death (Takahashi et al., 2004). From this incident one can learn that environmental 
sampling and proper storage is important. It also showed that microbial forensics is 
important as it enabled the investigators to identify the strain of B. anthracis released 8 years 
after the incident (Keim et al., 2001). 
During the period between October 29th and November 1, 1996, 13 workers at a clinical 
laboratory in Dallas, Texas developed acute and severe diarrhea after consumption of 
muffins or doughnuts (Carus, 2001). The pathogen Shigella dysenteriae type 2 was isolated 
from stool samples from the infected workers. This pathogen is uncommon and no other 
shigellosis outbreaks occurred in the US at that time. Furthermore, no work on Shigella had 
taken place at that clinical laboratory. However, an examination of the freezer in the clinical 
laboratory showed some evidence of tampering with reference cultures of S. dysenteriae type 
2. In August 1997, a laboratory technician was convicted of deliberately infecting coworkers 
with Shigella dysenteriae type 2 and sentenced to 20 years in prison (Everett, 2002). The 
laboratory and epidemiological investigations revealed a match of the laboratory strain to 
those isolated from food and clinical specimens. The tracing and epidemiological study was 
helped by the fact that only postproduction adulteration of the baked muffins and 
doughnuts could have resulted in their successful contamination. 
On October 4, 2001, shortly after 9/11, an inhalation anthrax case was reported in a 63-old 
male in Florida (Fennelly et al., 2004). Subsequently, additional persons were identified who 
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were infected with B. anthracis. Before the end of 2001, 22 cases of anthrax and 5 deaths had 
been reported. All of the anthrax cases were among postal workers or persons who had been 
in contact with contaminated mail. Exceptional collaboration was required from the 
different agencies involved. This event emphasized the importance of conducting public 
health and criminal investigations at the same time. The LRN served as a resource for 
identifying the agent in both environmental and clinical samples. An important lesson 
learned from this outbreak is that fine particles of a biological agent can become airborne, 
thus contaminating areas and placing persons at a risk and the need of microbial forensic 
(Dance, 2006). 
There are many lessons to be learned from these incidents. Different types of attackers such 
as extremist groups and lone wolves have been involved. In addition, these incidents 
necessitate that forensic and epidemiological investigations occur at the same time. For 
example, to provide the link between isolates from clinical and various environmental and 
food samples with the person responsible for the deliberate spread. The need for multiple 
response teams has also been identified as a lesson learned. 
Preparedness scenarios, training and exercises: The use of planning and preparedness 
scenarios between public health and law enforcement organizations will contribute to 
developing diagnostic response strategies. Different software tools are available for different 
preparedness applications. Over the last 10 years, various scenarios have been developed 
and used for different purposes. Modeling and bioterrorism scenarios have been used to 
evaluate responses to attacks with different agents causing diseases such as anthrax (Zaric et 
al., 2008), (Hupert et al., 2009), Foot and Mouth Disease (Schoenbaum et al., 2003), and Q-
fever (Pappas et al., 2007), as well as decision making (O'Toole et al., 2001) and Bayesian 
approaches for estimating bioterror attacks (Ray et al., 2011). Different scenarios and 
exercises have been used to improve various counter measures such as a local bioterrorism 
exercise (Hoffman et al., 2000), an exercise on threat assessment and quantitative risk 
assessment (Zilinskas et al., 2004), and an exercise training bioterrorism surveillance system 
(Berndt, 2003). Because there are a number of published models and scenarios available 
these can be used to develop and improve scenarios to challenge diagnostic response 
strategies in terms of coordination, capabilities and capacity. Results and output from these 
scenarios, training and exercises can be used to initiate new R&D activities. 
R&D activities. Joint R&D activities between first responders, forensic institutes and 
public health officials will contribute to developing appropriate methods. However this 
requires strategic planning and a laboratory infrastructure. Many R&D activities are 
performed in a specific sector, such as public health, animal health, food safety and law 
enforcement. Over the last few years joint diagnostic methods have been developed to 
counter bioterrorism. However, a lot of research has been performed without questioning 
the different diagnostic end-users at local, regional or national level and lessons learned 
from incidents and exercises have not always been considered. R&D activities have 
involved a broad spectra of methods such as electron microscopy (Goldsmith et al., 2009), 
new molecular methods (Casman, 2004), automated testing (Byrne et al., 2003) and 
screening (Emanuel et al., 2005), immunoassays for toxins (2008), microarray and 
multiplexing and nanotechnology methods (Menezes, 2011). Although technology has 
improved significantly since 2001 many diagnostic methods are still based on 
immunoassays, ELISA and PCR (Kellogg, 2010). First responders uses primarily field 
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based immunoassays and portable PCR-assays for biothreat detection, and local and 
sentinel public health laboratories uses traditional culture and biochemical assays, ELISAs 
and molecular-based PCR methods for biothreat identification. A problem with 
conventional detection methods are the lack of positive controls since these methods are 
based on living organisms. Rapid detection methods have been well investigated (Canton, 
2005) (Peruski et al., 2003). The most useful technology for identification of biothreat 
agents is real-time PCR. However, microarray and multiplex assays for detection of 
biothreat agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis and Yersinia pestis by using 
multiplex qPCR have recently improved (Janse et al., 2010). 
Implementation in response plans. Once new diagnostic methods are developed, they need 
to be evaluated and validated. This is an important step and requires access to reagents for 
proficiency testing and ring trial evaluations. Methods need to be validated for use in real 
incidents. The methods must also full fill requirements for forensic applications, which adds 
another aspect, see Table 2. 
 
Sample Monitoring and 
surveillance 
Alarm  
(covert 
and/overt) 
Laboratory 
Response 
Forensics 
Animal Animal Health 
and Animal 
surveillance 
Veterinarians/ 
First responders 
Veterinary 
laboratories 
Forensic 
laboratories 
Drinking water  Food and 
Environmental 
monitoring 
Food inspectors/
First responders 
Water and food 
laboratories 
Forensic 
laboratories 
Environmental Environmental 
monitoring 
Environmental 
inspectors/ 
First responders 
Environmental 
laboratories 
Forensic 
laboratories 
Feed Agricultural, 
Food and Animal 
Health 
Agricultural 
inspectors/ 
First responders 
Agricultural and 
veterinary 
Laboratories 
Forensic 
laboratories 
Food Food surveillance Food inspectors/
First responders 
Food laboratories Forensic 
laboratories 
Human clinical Human 
syndromic 
surveillance 
Physicians/ 
First responders 
Clinical 
laboratories 
(local, regional, 
national) 
Forensic 
laboratories 
Plant Plant surveillance Plant inspectors Agricultural 
laboratories 
Forensic 
laboratories 
Table 2. A Bioterrorism response matrix outlining laboratory support and the 
multidisciplinary cooperation. 
6. Challenges – coordination, capability and capacity 
Diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies shall consider coordination/resilience, 
harmonization, robustness and high- resolution diagnostic tools. This includes R&D efforts 
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of multidisciplinary detection technologies related to sampling, sample preparation, 
biomarker discovery, multiplexing and high resolution diagnostic typing tools (Knutsson et 
al., 2011). Clear mandate for coordination of response mechanisms is crucial and strong 
links between early warning systems provide a basis for the diagnostic bioterrorism 
response strategies. 
Coordination – public health and forensic laboratories. Full international cooperation and 
efficient detection technologies are essential in order to respond efficiently to a bioterrorism 
event. Considering the detection needs for covert and overt bioterrorism events will require 
a broad range of analytical tools. There are many promising technologies on the market but 
still there is a need to develop emerging technologies for different end-users. This can be 
promoted by multidisciplinary cooperation between first responders, forensic institutes and 
diagnostic laboratories representing LRNs. First responders have prerequisites to use the 
technology for a rapid identification of the agent on site and at the crime scene. The 
detection technology must be user friendly and allow usage in hot, warm and cold 
emergency zones. Forensic institutes’ major interest is to maintain chain of custody and 
have methods that are validated for use in court, including methods for evaluation of the 
results given the circumstances of the case (forensic interpretation). Public and animal 
health diagnostic laboratories have in general other needs. They must have a broad range of 
diagnostic methods available for further characterization and typing of the etiological agent. 
In general, joint response teams and the coordination and back-up of different laboratories 
are therefore crucial. The decision making procedure is very important and it has been 
described that in response to bioterrorism clinicians must make decisions in 4 critical 
domains (diagnosis, management, prevention and reporting to public health) and public 
health organizations must make decisions in 4 other domains (interpretation of bioterrorism 
surveillance data, outbreak investigation, outbreak control and communication) (Bravata et 
al., 2004). Early warning and coordinated rapid detection is a backbone and therefore the 
physicians’ ability to recognize potential cases in the identification and treatment of diseases 
associated with bioterrorism is crucial (Bush et al, 2001), as well as for veterinarians (Davis, 
2004). Bioterrorism response clinicians are essential partners to LRNs (Gerberding et al., 
2002) and especially at sentinel laboratories (Pien et al., 2006). Examples of the importance of 
the clinicians work is clearly documented (Maillard et al., 2002) (Harris et al., 2011) and also 
the consequences if the diseases is not identified (Harris et al., 2011). 
Capability and harmonization. To announce, for instance an anthrax outbreak (Sternberg 
Lewerin et al., 2010), and to make a declaration of an incident, decision makers needs 
validated methods. Standardized and validated PCR assays for high risk agents, such as B. 
anthracis (Wielinga et al., 2011) (Scarlata et al., 2010) and C. botulinum neurotoxin (Fenicia et 
al., 2011) are fundamental for confirming disease outbreaks. The methods should be tested 
in different countries and in different types of laboratories.  
Capacity and robustness. Initial sampling and rapid detection is crucial (Leport et al., 2011). 
However, feed, food, environmental and clinical samples all contains components that may 
inhibit the analysis (e.g., PCR-inhibitors). Appropriate sampling (Knutsson et al., 2003) and 
pre PCR processing strategies are therefore needed in order to circumvent inhibition. For 
this purpose models to investigate PCR inhibition is an important step to study and evaluate 
prior to applying a method for a specific purpose (Knutsson et al., 2002) (Knutsson et al, 
2002). Another important function is to have a laboratory surge capability in different areas 
in order to improve the robustness of the diagnostic capacity during a bioterrorism incident.  
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Fig. 3. Up-scaling capabilities by the use of automated DNA extractions robot in a BSL-3 
laboratory (Photo: SVA). 
High-resolution diagnostic tools. Multiplexing strategies for detection of several 
biomarkers (Lindberg et al., 2010), as well as various molecular typing methods are useful 
for crime scene investigation, but also for tracing and tracking the deliberate contamination. 
The use of massive parallel sequencing will be useful to study strain isolates from a 
suspicious deliberate contamination event. By applying bioinformatics it is possible to 
rapidly analyze large amounts of sequence data with minimal post-processing time 
(Segerman et al., 2011).  
7. Conclusions 
To obtain diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies a number of issues must be solved 
including strategic planning, laboratory infrastructure and standards. The laboratory work 
has to be strongly linked to different early warning and surveillance systems. Multiple 
teams as well as joint laboratory protocols are also important resources to have in place. The 
development of diagnostic bioterrorism response strategies should be based on lessons 
learned from previous attacks/incidents, planning scenarios, R&D activities and validation 
and implementations of methods. Laboratories must be able to detect, identify, respond and 
recover from covert and overt bioterrorism incidents. Key recommendations include:  
 Multisectoral and international laboratory cooperation to obtain rapid detection and 
identification of biothreat agents 
 Robust sampling and laboratory capacity for high-throughput needs 
 Laboratory capabilities for diagnostic characterization needs 
 Efficient IT-systems for sharing of data 
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